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Trial Practice and Procedure
by C. Frederick Overby*

Jason Crawford"
and
Teresa T. Abell***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The most notable and far-reaching judicial activity during this survey
period dealt with the summary judgment standard applied in tort cases.
Other noteworthy developments occurred in the areas of venue, renewal
of actions, collateral estoppel, and bifurcation of trials in cases involving
punitive damages. Only minimal legislation was enacted in the area of
trial practice and procedure during the survey period. This Article
focuses on the most notable decisions rendered by the judiciary and the
most significant legislation touching upon trial practice and procedure
in Georgia state courts.

* Partner in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia and member of the Board of Visitors, Walter F. George
School of Law, Mercer University (1993-1998). Georgia Southwestern State University
(B.S., 1981); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1984). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.B.A., magna cum laude,
1990); University of Georgia (J.D., magna cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Columbus State University (B.A., summa cum laude,
1991); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna curn laude, 1995).
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CASE LAW

The Summary Judgment Standard

Perhaps the single most important development during the survey
period was when the supreme court reviewed the unique ,summary
judgment standard that the court of appeals had been applying in "slip
and fall" cases-a standard which made successful pursuit of such a case
about as likely as meaningful campaign finance reform.' The landmark
decision was Robinson v. Kroger Co.,2 a garden-variety tort case in
which the plaintiff slipped on a foreign substance in a supermarket and
injured her knee.3
Before the supreme court granted certiorari in Robinson, any observer
of Georgia jurisprudence could predict with certainty a swift and decisive
victory for the supermarket. In a string of cases purportedly relying on
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon,4 the supreme court's last pronouncement
on the subject in 1980, the court of appeals created a summary judgment
standard for "slip and fall" cases that turned the ordinary burdens of
proof and production applicable to all other tort cases on their heads.'
Plaintiffs were forced to prove, as part of their prima facie case, the
defendant's "superior knowledge", of the hazard involved.6 "Superior
knowledge" required the plaintiffs to prove they exercised due care for
their own safety.7 However, in other words, not only did "slip and fall"
plaintiffs necessarily need to prove the negligence of the defendants, but
they also had to affirmatively disprove their own contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk.' Failure to carry either burden barred

1. As the supreme court succinctly put it, "[T]he pendulum made a dramatic swing in
the other direction as it became the rare case which escaped summary adjudication."
Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736, 493 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997).
2. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
3. Id. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
4. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
5. See generally Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. James, 225 Ga. App. 846, 846-47, 485
S.E.2d 223, 223-25 (1997); Nails v. Food Lion, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 405, 406, 471 S.E.2d 327,
329 (1996) (plaintiffs "failure to watch where she was walking forecloses her recovery");
Baker v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 219 Ga. App. 513, 465 S.E.2d 710 (1995); Boykin v.
North, 218 Ga. App. 435, 461 S.E.2d 598 (1995); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ga.
App. 808, 810, 406 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1991) (plaintiff's failure to look at floor coupled with
admission that plaintiff would have observed hazard had plaintiff been looking held
sufficient to establish lack of care for own safety as matter of law).
6. Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 157, 159-60, 447 S.E.2d 122, 124
(1994).
7. 268 Ga. at 736, 493 S.E.2d at 406.
8. Id. at 738, 493 S.E.2d at 407.
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recovery completely.9 However, in all other tort cases, the burden is on
the defendants to prove the plaintiffs' contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk as affirmative defenses. The jury may also
consider the comparative negligence of the respective parties.' °
One might ask, as the supreme court ultimately did when granting
certiorari, how one proves with affirmative evidence that one was not
negligent?" The task proved so hard that questions of negligence and
contributory negligence, long reserved for jury determination in all but
the clearest cases, became decisions for the courts in almost every "slip
and fall" case. 2
Indeed, Mrs. Robinson could not show she had been watching the floor
continuously as she placed each footfall-a standard arguably proper for
tightrope walkers but not even advisable for negotiators of supermarket
aisles-so the trial court dismissed her case.'" The court of appeals
affirmed summary judgment. 4 The case might have ended at this
point, but plaintiff's counsel filed as a matter of course a petition for
certiorari, asking the supreme court to revisit the issue of the proper
summary judgment standard to apply in "slip and fall" cases. The
supreme court granted certiorari to address this issue."
In division 1 of its opinion, a unanimous supreme court reversed
The court expressly disapproved of "the appelsummary judgment.'
late decisions which hold as a matter of law that an invitee's failure to
see before falling the hazard which caused the invitee to fall constitutes
a failure to exercise ordinary care." 7 The court condemned the decision
to dismiss plaintiff's case based on an admission that "she failed to look
at the location where she subsequently placed her foot.""
The high court reasoned that the court of appeals decisions wrongly
made summary adjudication of negligence issues the norm in "slip and

9. Id. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
10. THoMAs F. GREEN, JR., GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE 19 (4th ed. 1994) (citing Stewart
v. Mynatt, 135 Ga. 637, 70 S.E. 325 (1911)) (burden of proof of affirmative defenses,
including contributory negligence, on defendant). See Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668,
674, 16 S.E.2d 214,220 (1941) (defining comparative negligence). See also O.C.G.A. § 46-8291 (1992) (comparative negligence allowed in railroad cases).
11. 268 Ga. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
12. Id. at 739, 493 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Ellington v. Tolar Const. Co., 237 Ga. 235, 237,
227 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1976)).
13. Id. at 743, 493 S.E.2d at 410.
14. Id. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 743, 493 S.E.2d at 411.
17. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 410.
18. Id.
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fall" cases, rather than the exception. 9 Also, the unique "slip and fall"
standard elevated the plaintiff's duty to exercise care to paramount
importance such that a finding of any knowledge, rather than superior
knowledge, on the part of the plaintiff constituted a complete bar to a
jury determination.2" Finally, the "slip and fall" standard inexplicably
transformed the "plain view" doctrine into a bar to recovery any time the
plaintiff could have discovered any hazard, no matter how small or
inconspicuous, if the plaintiff had inspected the placement of each
footfall.2'
In division 2 of the opinion, in somewhat of an advisory opinion, six
of the seven Justices addressed two recurring "slip and fall" subjects
which were not technically at issue in Robinson: the "distraction
doctrine" and the parties' respective burdens of proof. 2 This Article
will only explore the supreme court's exposition on the proper burdens
of proof because that part of the court's opinion will change "slip and
fall" practice and procedure drastically by bringing it back in line with
the procedures followed in all other tort cases.
Oddly enough, it was not Alterman Foods alone that saddled "slip and
fall" plaintiffs with the typically insurmountable burden of proving their
own nonnegligence at the summary judgment stage. When Alterman
Foods was decided, the defendant had the burden at the summary
judgment stage of coming forward with affirmative evidence refuting at
least one element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.2" So, practically
speaking, the defendant was necessarily required to produce evidence of
the plaintiff's negligence before the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating
nonnegligence arose.
When the supreme court decided Lau's Corp. v. Haskins,2 4 the
confluence of Lau's with Alterman Foods led to the unique "slip and fall"
standard overruled by the supreme court in Robinson.25 For the first
time, after Lau's, a defendant who does not have the burden of proof on
an issue was allowed to obtain summary judgment by merely pointing
to a lack of evidence possessed by the plaintiff in support of at least one
element of his prima facie case.26 Synergistically, these two cases

19. Id. at 739, 493 S.E.2d at 408.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 742-43, 493 S.E.2d at 409-10.
22. Id. at 743-49, 493 S.E.2d at 411-14.
23. Id. at 747, 493 S.E.2d at 413 (citing Hilsman v. Kroger Co., 187 Ga. App. 570, 572,
370 S.E.2d 755, 757 (1988) (Sognier, J., concurring specially)).
24. 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
25. 268 Ga. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
26. Id. at 747, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
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forced "slip and fall" plaintiffs to prove their lack of negligence to the
trial court or lose the right to a jury determination of negligence issues.
In Robinson, the supreme court elected to modify Alterman Foods in
order to correct this misapplication of the summary judgment burden in
"slip and fall" cases.27 Now the defendant again has the burden of
coming forward with evidence of the plaintiff's lack of due care before
any duty of showing care is triggered on the part of the plaintiff.28 The
supreme court went on to
remind members of the judiciary that the 'routine" issues of premises
liability, i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff's lack of ordinary care for personal safety are generally not
susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment is
granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.29
The decision in Robinson was foreshadowed by a full panel debate of
the proper summary judgment standard by the court of appeals in the
case of Bruno's Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylor.30 In Bruno's, plaintiff
slipped on a wet floor at a supermarket allegedly because of an
independent floor cleaning company's failure to remove the water from
the floor and failure to place warning signs.3 ' The case involved a
multitude of oft-encountered "slip and fall" issues, but its pertinence to
the trial practice and procedure survey stems from the lively debate
between the majority and special concurrence over the proper summary
judgment standard to apply to "slip and fall" cases. 2 The disagreement
between esteemed members of the court of appeals, after years and
scores of "slip and fall" precedent, highlighted the need for supreme
court review of the summary judgment standard in "slip and fall" cases.
The majority in Bruno's, constrained by the Alterman Foods and Lau's
standard, struggled mightily to shape its analysis in a more even-handed
way than in past opinions. The end result denied summary judgment
based on a finding of "active negligence" by the supermarket and the
court's refusal to draw a "negative inference" against plaintiff at the
summary judgment stage. 3
The finding of "active negligence" was significant because it ostensibly
removed Bruno's from the "static condition" analysis utilized in "slip and

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 747-48, 493 S.E.2d at 413-14.
Id. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
228 Ga. App. 439, 491 S.E.2d 881 (1997).
Id. at 439, 491 S.E.2d at 884.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 881.
Id. at 448, 491 S.E.2d at 890.

364

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

fall" cases and transformed it into an ordinary negligence action.14 In
ordinary negligence actions, the defendants, not the plaintiffs, carry the
burden of proof with respect to whether the plaintiffs exercised ordinary
care for their own safety. 5 Comparative negligence also applies so that
the jury still decides the issue even if the plaintiff was negligent to some
degree as a matter of law.36
The majority could have easily ended its analysis by holding that
because defendant, who had the burden of proving plaintiff's negligence
in "active negligence" cases, had come forward with no positive proof of
negligence by plaintiff, summary judgment was inappropriate. After all,
it is settled doctrine that questions of negligence are left for the jury in
all but plain, palpable, and undisputed cases. 7 Instead, the majority
cannot
expounded for several more pages, holding summary judgment
8
be based upon a "negative inference" against the nonmovant.
While this principle seems clear from a wealth of precedent, notwithstanding the disagreement of the special concurrence, it is no profound
revelation.3" When nonmovants carry the burden of proof, the only
question at summary judgment is whether the nonmovant has offered
any evidence in support of each element of the claim.4" Inferences
which negate an element of the nonmovant's prima facie case are
meaningless. If the nonmovants present any evidence, or evidence which
allows an inference, in support of their claim, then summary judgment
is inappropriate no matter what negative inferences might also be
drawn. If nonmovants present no evidence in support of their claim,

34. Id. at 443, 491 S.E.2d at 887.
35. THOMAS F. GREEN, JR., GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE 19 (4th ed. 1994). The majority
alluded to the fact that the issue of the plaintiffs negligence was an affirmative defense
with respect to which the defendant properly carries the burden of proof. Yet, inexplicably,
the court failed to make this dispositive point. See 228 Ga. App. at 447 n.5, 491 S.E.2d at
889 n.5.
36. See Bruno's Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 228 Ga. App. at 447 n.5, 491 S.E.2d at 889
n.5.
37. Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 129, 381 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989); Ellington
v. Tolar Constr. Co., 237 Ga. 235, 237, 227 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1976); Wynne v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 626, 126 S.E. 388, 389 (1925); Service Merchandise, Inc. v.
Jackson, 221 Ga. App. 897, 898-99, 473 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1996); Pique v. Lee, 218 Ga. App.
357, 359, 461 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1995).
38. 228 Ga. App. at 446-48, 491 S.E.2d at 888-90.
39. Id. at 451, 491 S.E.2d at 892 (Birdsong, concurring specially). As pointed out (and
apparently unheeded) by the special concurrence, the United States Supreme Court has
held that "if the trial court is presented with a choice of inferences to be drawn from the
facts (then] all inferences of fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing must be drawn
against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion." Id. (citing United
States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
40. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 495, 405 S.E.2d 474, 478 (1991).
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then summary judgment is appropriate, not because of any negative
inference, but because of the nonmovants' inability to offer any evidence
in support of their claim.41
B.

Venue

As usual; this year produced several decisions that elucidated
Georgia's venue rules. One notable case was Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich
Tire Co. 42 Ford initially involved three defendants: one corporate
resident of Fulton County, one corporate resident of Clayton County, and
a foreign partnership that was not a resident of any Georgia county but
consisted of two partners, one of whom was a resident of Fulton
County.43 Suit was brought in Fulton County, with venue based on the
presence of the Fulton County corporate defendant."'
After plaintiffs settled with the Fulton County corporate defendant,
which was then dismissed from the lawsuit, only the nonresident
defendants remained.45 The question became whether the Fulton
County residence of one partner in a foreign partnership allowed venue
in Fulton County pursuant to the general rule that allows a partnership
to be sued in any county where one of its partners resides.46 The court
of appeals said no: "The plain language of the Long Arm Statute shows
that the status of the defendant partnership, not the status of the
individual partners, determines both residency and venue. " "
The glaring omission from the analysis is that the court stated no
reason for limiting venue to those choices set forth in the Long Arm
Statute. The mere fact that defendant was a nonresident did not require
application of the Long Arm Statute if other means of serving defendant
existed. For instance, the Nonresident Motorist Act 4 allows service of
nonresident drivers in situations where the Long Arm Statute would
also apply, and under that scheme, a plaintiff is given a whole different
set of venue choices.49 A nonresident defendant temporarily sojourning
in Georgia can be served where he or she is found, and venue will lie in
the county where service was perfected, notwithstanding the applicabili-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
231 Ga. App. 11, 497 S.E.2d 596 (1998).
Id. at 12-13, 497 S.E.2d at 597-98.
See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 4.
231 Ga. App. at 12, 497 S.E.2d at 598.
Id. at 13, 497 S.E.2d at 598.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 to -8 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
See id. § 40-12-3 (1997).
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ty of the Long Arm Statute.5" Nothing contained within the Long Arm
Statute suggests its exclusivity, either as to service or venue. 51
In Ford, defendant partnership was brought into the lawsuit by the
trial court, and apparently, service was perfected under the Long Arm
Statute.52 The holding of the court of appeals at least suggests that if
the practitioner obtains service based on the Long Arm Statute, that
scheme's venue choices are exclusive." When serving a nonresident
defendant, the wise practitioner would be well advised to serve the
defendants with process in as many legal ways as possible. This way,
one secures maximum flexibility in venue choices.
In Georgia Department of Transportation v. Evans, 4 the supreme
court affirmed a court of appeals decision analyzed in last year's survey
article.55 The supreme court construed the exclusive venue provisions
set forth in the Georgia Tort Claims Act56 and held venue in a wrongful
death action was indeed proper in the county where the plaintiff expired,
regardless of where the tort occurred.57 Such county constitutes "the
county wherein the loss occurred."58
The DOT argued that because the collision, injuries, pain and
suffering, and eventual death of plaintiff occurred in various counties,
the cause of action must be split and filed in several counties unless
"loss" is defined as where the "occurrence" took place.5 9 In important
dicta, the court made short work of this argument, stating nothing in the
Tort Claims Act venue provision "precludes
the plaintiff's election of
60
venue among the locations of loss."
In Barnett v. Quinn,6 the court of appeals made it clear that if
plaintiff settles with the only resident defendant and wishes to retain
venue by means of a consent judgment, plaintiff should do so before
dismissing the resident defendant. 2 Plaintiff's dismissal of the local
defendant without first obtaining a consent judgment caused venue to

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 9-10-33 (1982).
Id. § 9-10-91 to -93 (1982 & Supp. 1998).
Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Ga. App. 11, 12,497 S.E.2d 596,598 (1998).
Id. at 13-14, 497 S.E.2d at 598-99.
269 Ga. 400, 499 S.E.2d 321 (1998).
Id. at 401, 499 S.E.2d at 323.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 (1998).
269 Ga. at 400-01, 499 S.E.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 400, 499 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 400-01, 499 S.E.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 401, 499 S.E.2d at 323.
227 Ga. App. 172, 489 S.E.2d 68 (1997).
Id. at 174-75, 489 S.E.2d at 70.
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vanish.6 3 The case was properly transferred to a county where proper
venue existed, and the case could not be transferred back to the original
county once a consent judgment was obtained from the settling
defendant because no provision allows transfer from a county where
venue is proper.r
Finally, in Airgrowers, Inc. v. Tomlinson,65 the court of appeals
upheld the principle of vanishing venue in the context of a crossclaim.66 The court reasoned that when the main claim against the only
resident defendant has been dismissed, even by consent judgment, in
order to adjudicate a cross-claim, an independent basis for venue must
exist.67
C.

The Renewal Statute and Statute of Limitations

Once more, appellate decisions addressing Georgia's Renewal
Statute6' and Georgia's various statutes of limitations abound. In
Milburn v. Nationwide Insurance Co.,69 the court of appeals gaveth and
the court of appeals tooketh away. The court ruled the suit was
renewable but disallowed renewal due to plaintiff's lack of diligence.7 °
Milburn involved a renewal action naming the actual tortfeasor. The
initial, dismissed action named a "John Doe" defendant instead.7 In
division 1, subsection (a), the court determined that the naming of a
"John Doe" defendant in place of the actual tortfeasor, who was never
served in the initial action, did not render the initial action void, but
merely voidable.72 In division 1(b), the court ruled the "John Doe"
defendant from the first suit and the named defendant from the second
suit were "in substance identical."7 3 Thus, the Renewal Statute could
be applied to allow a second suit to be filed against the tortfeasor within
six months after the dismissal of the initial action, even though the
statute of limitations had run. 7"

63. Id. "The venerable principle of vanishing venue was well established at the turn
of the century." Id. at 174, 489 S.E.2d at 70. These authors hope that the venerable
principle will not make it to the turn of the next one.
64. Id. at 175, 489 S.E.2d at 70-71.
65. 230 Ga. App. 415, 496 S.E.2d 528 (1998).
66. Id. at 416-17, 496 S.E.2d at 529-30.
67. Id. at 417, 496 S.E.2d at 530.
68. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 1998).
69. 228 Ga. App. 398, 491 S.E.2d 848 (1997).

70. Id. at 402-03, 491 S.E.2d at 852-53.
71. Id. at 398, 491 S.E.2d at 849-50.
72. Id. at 399-400, 491 S.E.2d at 850.

73. Id. at 400, 491 S.E.2d at 851.
74. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

At this point in the opinion, plaintiff's chances looked promising.
However, division 1(c) dictated a different result. For in division 1(c),
the court held that to renew successfully a dismissed "John Doe" action
against the actual tortfeasor, the plaintiff must meet the requirements
of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(c) for relation-back of amendments to
pleadings.75 In other words, the tortfeasor must: "(1) ha[ve] received
such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced
in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) kn[olw or should have
known that, but for the mistaken identity, the action would have been
brought against him."76 Because plaintiff failed to plead even these
necessary facts, the lawsuit was not saved by the Renewal Statute.7 7
This holding finds no support in any reading of O.C.G.A. section 9-1115(c), which only purports to address relation-back of pleadings in a
single case, as opposed to relation-back of an entire renewed lawsuit to
a previous action. Also, it will only be the rarest of circumstances when
a plaintiff who does not know the identity of the tortfeasor will ever
meet the relation-back test of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(c).
One of the cases cited by the court, Brer Rabbit Mobile Home Sales v.
Perry,7" applied O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(c) to renewal actions, but that
case did not analyze the language of the rule at all. 9 The court merely
cited a case that applied O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(c) in its intended
context to the addition of a party by an amended complaint, rather than
a renewed action. 0
The court of appeals reached a similar holding concerning relationback of an amended complaint "substituting" a known defendant when
the original complaint named a "John Doe" defendant in the case of
Bishop v. Farhat."' In Bishop the court of appeals ruled again that the
proper test was contained in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(c). 2 The plaintiff
is allowed to amend the complaint substituting the named defendant as
a matter of right at any time before the entry of the pretrial order."3

75. Id. at 401, 491 S.E.2d at 851.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 403, 491 S.E.2d at 852.
78. 132 Ga. App. 128, 207 S.E.2d 578 (1974).
79. Id. at 129, 207 S.E.2d at 579.
80. Id. (citing Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 482, 206 S.E.2d 121, 135
(1974)).
81. 227 Ga. App. 201, 489 S.E.2d 323 (1997).
82. Id. at 202, 489 S.E.2d 326. The court rejected the trial court's application of
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-21, which allows the addition of parties "by order of the court." Id.

83. Id.
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Upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court simply determines

whether the requisites for relation-back exist.84
More significant, perhaps, was the court's unflinching reliance upon
a continuing tort theory to toll the statute of limitations in failure to
warn cases. 5 In Bishop plaintiff, a nurse, developed an allergy to latex
gloves.8 6 The court ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled until
the injured plaintiff discovered the defendant's failure to warn, which,
in the context of this case, was when the cause of plaintiff's problems
was discovered.8 7
In Walker v. Melton,88 the court also allowed the extension of the
applicable two year statute of limitations in a misdiagnosis case.89 The
court made it clear, however, that its holding was strictly limited to
situations where the misdiagnosis caused a new and distinct injury that
occurred subsequent to the misdiagnosis.' To bar such a claim, the
court opined, would run afoul of supreme court precedent holding that
barring a cause of action based on the statute of limitations before the
injury has accrued and, thus, before a cause of action yet exists, violates
equal protection. 9
The court seemingly merged the reasoning of Bishop and Walker in a
medical malpractice case based on the failure to warn of the problems
associated with a certain type of temporomandibular joint implants.9 2
The court could have cited the tolling principle applied to failure to warn
cases set forth in Bishop and held the statute of limitations suspended
until plaintiff discovered the cause of her injury. Apparently, the court
thought such a holding would have conflicted with established precedent
that holds "[t]he limitation period 'begins to run on the date on which an
injury arising from an act of malpractice occurs and physically manifests
itself, rather than when the plaintiff discovers the causal relationship
between the injury and the defendant's breach of duty."'93

84. Id.
85. Id. at 203, 489 S.E.2d at 327.
86. Id. at 201, 489 S.E.2d at 325.
87. Id. at 205, 489 S.E.2d at 327. The court held that plaintiff's earlier belief that her
problems were caused by the powder on the gloves-as opposed to the latex-did not begin
accrual of the period of limitations. Id. "[A] jury question exist[ed] as to when [the
plaintiff] associated her problems with 'latex allergy.'" Id.
88. 227 Ga. App. 149, 151, 489 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1997).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 151, 489 S.E.2d at 64-65.
91. Id., 489 S.E.2d at 65 (citing Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 58-60, 316 S.E.2d 155,

157-59 (1984) and Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 472, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1983)).
92. Screven v. Drs. Gruskin & Lucas, P.C., 227 Ga. App. 756, 490 S.E.2d 422 (1997).
93. Id. at 758,490 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting Oxley v. Kilpatrick, 225 Ga. App. 838, 839-40,
486 S.E.2d 44, 45-46 (1997)).
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Instead, the court of appeals professed an analysis similar to that
employed in Walker, holding "to the extent that [the plaintiff] can show
an injury arising from the delay in notifying her, such as that it is now
inoperable, she presents an issue for a jury." " In other words, as in
Walker, the plaintiff must show a new and distinct injury that occurred
subsequent to and as a result of the malpractice-the failure to warn.95
The court never actually analyzed whether plaintiff proved such an
injury; the court seemed to base its determination of when the statute
of limitations began running entirely upon the time plaintiff discovered
the causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct.9"
In another renewal case, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Reid,9" the supreme court determined that plaintiff's failure to serve his
uninsured motorist carrier in the initial suit did not preclude valid
service of the carrier in a renewed action from relating back.9 8
In two interesting cases with which any trial practitioner ought to be
familiar, the court of appeals created a judicial obstacle course for any
plaintiff who has difficulty serving a defendant within the statute of
limitations. In the first case, Black v. Knight,99 the court ruled that a
suit that was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court for failure to
exercise due diligence in obtaining timely service of process was void
and, therefore, not subject to renewal. 0 0 The same court held in a
separate case, Allen v. Kahn,'' that a suit voluntarily dismissed before
the trial court could rule on plaintiff's due diligence in perfecting
service
10 2
can be renewed because such a suit is voidable, not void.
The difference between the two cases is that once service has been
perfected, the suit is voidable and not void until the trial court rules
upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The moral is to dismiss and
refile, if at all possible, before the court has a chance to rule on the due
diligence issue.
Finally, the court of appeals held in Robinson v. Stokes' that a
compulsory counterclaim, if voluntarily dismissed in the original action,
cannot be renewed because of the bar of res judicata. °4

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 759, 490 S.E.2d at 425.
Id.
Id.
268 Ga. 432, 491 S.E.2d 51 (1997).
Id. at 434, 491 S.E.2d at 52.
231 Ga. App. 820, 499 S.E.2d 69 (1998).
Id. at 820, 499 S.E.2d at 70.
231 Ga. App. 438, 499 S.E.2d 164 (1998).
Id. at 439-40, 499 S.E.2d at 166.
229 Ga. App. 25, 493 S.E.2d 5 (1997).
Id. at 27, 493 S.E.2d at 7.
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CollateralEstoppel

In a rare attempt to settle between two diametrically opposed lines of
cases, a full panel opinion of the court of appeals finally decided in
Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co. 10 5 that mutuality of estoppel is required
10 6
before relitigation of an issue can be barred by collateral estoppel.
In other words, a party is not bound by a prior judicial determination of
an issue unless10 7the opposite party could also have been bound by the
determination.
For several years now, whether or not collateral estoppel requires
mutuality has depended entirely upon which panel of the court of
appeals heard the case. 08 The full panel decision in Wickliffe expressly overruled the line of cases that adopted the modern view, while
calling for the supreme court to adopt the modern view for reasons of
judicial economy."'
E.

Confidentiality Settlement Agreements and Orders

The court of appeals expressly placed the truth-seeking function of the
courts and the discovery process above the confidentiality concerns of
private litigants in previously settled suits. The case was Barger v.
Garden Way, Inc.," ° a product liability action involving an allegedly
defective chipper/shredder.
In discovery, plaintiff sought to identify other victims of the allegedly
defective chipper/shredder. Plaintiff requested that defendant produce
"statements . . . by other persons injured by the product ... ; and [for

105. 227 Ga. App. 432, 489 S.E.2d 153 (1997).
106. Id. at 434-35, 489 S.E.2d at 156.
107. Id. The court expressed its view that the supreme court ought to adopt the
.modern view" which does not require mutuality for collateral estoppel to apply. Id. at 43435, 489 S.E.2d at 156. It seems questionable, however, whether or not the supreme court
has such power because identity of parties is a requirement expressed specifically by the
statute which codifies collateral estoppel. See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (1993).
108. For the line of cases adopting the "modern view" that mutuality of estoppel is not
required, see Ervin v. Swift Adhesives, 208 Ga. App. 265, 266, 430 S.E.2d 133, 134 (1993);
Wilson v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 616, 618-19, 402 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1991);
Winters v. Pund, 179 Ga. App. 349, 352-53, 352 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (1986); Watts v. Lippitt,
171 Ga. App. 578, 579, 320 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (1984). For the line of cases continuing to
apply the mutuality requirement, see Toporek v. Zepp, 224 Ga. App. 26, 28, 479 S.E.2d
759, 760 (1996); Miller v. Steelmaster Material Handling Corp., 223 Ga, App. 532, 535, 478
S.E.2d 601, 603-04 (1996); Miller v. Charles, 211 Ga. App. 386, 387, 439 S.E.2d 88, 88-89
(1993); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 197 Ga. App. 852, 852, 399 S.E.2d 708, 709
(1990).
109. 227 Ga. App. at 434-35, 489 S.E.2d at 155-56.
110. 231 Ga. App. 723, 499 S.E.2d 737 (1998).

372

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

defendant to] allow disclosure of relevant information by persons
otherwise prohibited from making disclosures [allegedly] due to the
existence of confidentiality orders or agreements."
Defendant
opposed disclosure of any such testimony because of the alleged right to
silence for which defendant had previously bought and paid. 112
Citing Georgia's statute that prevents contracts based on illegal
consideration, such as contracts which violate the public policy of
Georgia, the court held that the discovery must be permitted."'
Contracts which purport to prevent a witness from testifying in response
to a subpoena, subsequent court order, or notice of deposition violate two
specific statutory declarations of Georgia public policy: (1) "The object
of all legal investigation is the discovery of the truth. The rules of
evidence are framed with a view to this prominent end, seeking always
for pure sources and the highest evidence";"" and (2) "[plarties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action.
,,1" The court
held that an implicit term in any confidentiality agreement or order is
that a party to the agreement may nevertheless testify or otherwise
comply with a subpoena, court order, or applicable law."6
This ruling fundamentally makes good sense because parties ought not
be allowed to contract away their legal obligations, frustrating the legal
rights of those persons seeking subsequent redress.
F

CollateralSource Evidence
In yet another decision concerning whether or not trial courts should
qualify jurors with respect to interested liability insurers, the court of
appeals in Dalton v. Vo1 7 again responded affirmatively."' It makes
no difference if the insurer is a mutual or a stock company."9
Two matters of interest should be noted from the opinion. First, the
court rejected defendant's post-trial argument that if asked, the jurors
would testify as to a lack of knowledge of any financial interest in the
case. 2 ° The rejection of this argument comes as no surprise because
defendant apparently offered no supporting evidence. The court's

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 724, 499 S.E.2d at 740.
Id.
231 Ga. App. at 724-25, 499 S.E.2d at 740-41 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-3-45 (1982)).
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2 (1995).
Id. § 9-11-26(b)(1) (1993).
231 Ga. App. at 725-26, 499 S.E.2d at 741.
230 Ga. App. 413, 414, 497 S.E.2d 245, 246 (1998).
Id. at 414, 497 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 413, 497 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 413-14, 497 S.E.2d at 246-47.
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citation of O.C.G.A. section 9-10-9, which allows affidavits that uphold
but do not impeach the verdict to be considered, is curious because any
121
such affidavit would indeed uphold the verdict rendered in the case.
The second point of interest in the opinion is the continuing debate
among members of the court of appeals over whether or not the jury pool
should be qualified with respect to the specific insurers or merely asked
if they know of any financial interest they have in the case. Chief Judge
Andrews endorsed the latter view in footnote two of his opinion,'22 a
view apparently shared by Judges Johnson 23 and Beasley.'2 4 Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Blackburn concurred
specially to make
125
known their support of the former approach.
Judge Pope made the practical suggestion that the trial court avoid
any prejudice to the defendant by giving a specific limiting instruction
that the existence or lack of insurance in a given case is immaterial and
not to be considered in reaching a decision.'26 This suggestion seems
to strike the better balance between the plaintiff's absolute right to an
impartial jury pool and the defendant's right not to have the existence
of insurance prejudice the determination of the case. After all, "[a]ny
juror who doesn't know that there is liability insurance in the case [of
a motor vehicle collision] by this time should
2 7 probably be excused by
virtue of the fact that he or she is an idiot."
In Goss Brothers TRucking v. Ashley, 2 ' the court of appeals held that
a lawyer's leading question containing the amount of insurance coverage
available required a mistrial. 2 9 It made no difference that the
question was never 13answered
and that the trial court gave a strong
0
curative instruction.

121. Id. at 414 n.1, 497 S.E.2d at 247 n.1.
122. Id. at 414 n.2, 497 S.E.2d at 247 n.2.
123. Byrd v. Daus, 218 Ga. App. 145, 460 S.E.2d 819 (1995).
124. Franklin v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 433 S.E.2d 710 (1993).
125. 230 Ga. App. at 414-15, 497 S.E.2d at 247 (Pope, P.J., concurring specially).
126. Id. at 415, 497 S.E.2d at 247.
127. Young v. Carter, 121 Ga. App. 191, 193, 173 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1970) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
128. 228 Ga. App. 354, 492 S.E.2d 7 (1997).
129. Id. at 355, 492 S.E.2d at 8. The existence of insurance was properly before the
jury, as the insurer was a party to the action under O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(e) (1992 & Supp.
1998), Georgia's Direct Action Statute. Id. at 354-55, 492 S.E.2d at 9. Under the statute,
in certain cases involving motor common and contract carriers, the liability insurer can be
joined as a party-defendant in the lawsuit. Under such circumstances, no evidence of the
amount of insurance available may be introduced. See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos,
246 Ga. 746, 747, 272 S.E.2d 702, 703 (1980).
130. 228 Ga. App. at 356-57, 492 S.E.2d at 9-10.
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A strong dissent cautioned that requiring an automatic mistrial if
insurance was mentioned completely divests the trial court of its muchneeded discretion. 3 ' "Such an approach invites the possibility of
abuse, where a savvy attorney who perceives the case is proceeding
poorly could strategically
elect to ask the forbidden question to trigger
13 2
an automatic mistrial."
G. PersonalJurisdiction
The only decision of note in the area of personal jurisdiction was
Goldstein v. Goldstein. 13 This domestic action involved a custody
dispute over the couple's minor child.3 Primary physical custody was
previously granted to the father by the Superior Court of Cobb County. 35 The mother abducted the child from school and took him to her
native Switzerland where she
obtained a temporary ex parte custody
136
order from the Swiss court.

The father brought two actions in Cobb County Superior Court, one
seeking to have the mother held in contempt and the other seeking
exclusive custody.13 The mother contested personal jurisdiction but
nonetheless filed her own action in Cobb County Superior Court seeking
a modification of the initial
custody order based on domestication of the
13
temporary Swiss order.
The trial court consolidated the actions and ruled in favor of the
father. 13 On appeal, the court of appeals held that by seeking affirmative relief in the Cobb County Superior Court, the mother submitted
herself to personal jurisdiction to the full extent "sufficient to answer all
the ends of justice respecting the suit originally instituted ....
Because each of the actions involved the same issue, custody of the
couple's minor child, the superior court was authorized to exercise
personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Goldstein.'

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 359, 492 S.E.2d at 11-12 (Banke, J., dissenting).
Id., 492 S.E.2d at 12.
229 Ga. App. 862, 494 S.E.2d 745 (1997).
Id. at 862, 494 S.E.2d at 746.
Id.
Id. at 862 & n.2, 494 S.E.2d at 746-47 & n.2.
Id. at 862-63, 494 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 863-64, 494 S.E.2d at 747-48.
Id. at 863, 494 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 864, 494 S.E.2d at 748.
Id. at 864-65, 494 S.E.2d at 748.

TRIAL PRACTICE

19981

H.

375

Parties

In Tri-County Investment Group v. Southern States, Inc.,142 the court
of appeals reaffirmed the venerable principle that in an action for
continuing nuisance, each continuance of the nuisance-be it from
migration of pollution, for example-constitutes a new tort from which
the statute of limitations runs."' The court also made it clear that a
real-party-in-interest objection is not a matter for summary judgment;
it is a matter in abatement that does not warrant dismissal until after
a reasonable time for the real party to be joined or substituted.'"
The aspect of the case most interesting to this survey Article, and the
most utterly confusing, stems from its seeming extension of O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-15(c) without citation. 145 Section 9-11-15(c) allows relation-back of amendments adding or substituting defendants under
certain circumstances, but the court extended the relation-back principle
to apply to the addition of a plaintiff.'"
The court held that a partnership, which was the real-party-in-interest
to a 1995 lawsuit filed erroneously by a related corporation, should have
been added to the suit upon plaintiff corporation's motion, if addition
was possible. 4 7 The court then held that if adding the partnership
was possible and had been done, an identical 1997 lawsuit filed by the
partnership would necessarily be dismissed because of the pendency of
the prior 1995 action.' 48
I. Requests for Admissions
The supreme court made it clear in G. H. Bass & Co. v. Fulton County
Board of Tax Assessors14 that requests for admissions "are not objectionable 'even if they require opinions or conclusions of law, as long as
the legal conclusions relate to the facts of the case. ' ""' The court
relied upon interpretations of the federal rule of civil procedure

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

231 Ga. App. 632, 500 S.E.2d 22 (1998).
Id. at 635-36, 500 S.E.2d at 25.
Id. at 636, 500 S.E.2d at 26.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (1993).
Id.
231 Ga. App. at 637, 500 S.E.2d at 27.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-5(a) (1982).
268 Ga. 327, 486 S.E.2d 810 (1997).
Id. at 328, 486 S.E.2d at 811 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 36).
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authorizing
requests for admission,1 5' which is identical to the Georgia
152
rule.

J.

Discovery Sanctions

In South Georgia Medical Center v. Washington, 5 ' the supreme
court finally answered a question the court of appeals could not seem to
agree upon: can a party claim the benefit of discovery sanctions imposed
against the opposing party for failure to respond to a deposition notice
issued by a co-party?5
The supreme court said yes,'55 after a full
panel of the court of appeals said no, 5 ' after a single panel of the
court of appeals had said yes,' 57 and after the trial court said yes.'58
The court justified its decision based on
the economic realities of the practice of law, the scheduling of depositions, and the difficulties inherent in both .... [I]n cases involving
multiple parties, depositions will frequently be attended by all parties
and their counsel. The scheduling of such deposition involves a
tremendous amount of communication, coordination, and planning.
When the deponent fails to appear, it is irrefutable that all parties, not
just the
noticing party, suffer inconvenience and lost preparation
59
time.1
The trial court answered the issue correctly originally and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint against both parties. 6 ' On the first appeal, the
panel of the court of appeals agreed but remanded the case because the
trial court erred by not considering plaintiff's response to the nonnoticing
party's motion for sanctions.' 6'
After the trial court considered plaintiff's response and again
dismissed the complaint, the full panel of the court of appeals reversed,
holding that a party cannot benefit from sanctions imposed because of
failure to attend a deposition noticed by another party.6 2 Writing for

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
226 Ga.
160.
161.
162.

FED. R. CIv. P. 36.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36 (1993).
269 Ga. 366, 497 S.E.2d 793 (1998).
Id. at 366-67, 497 S.E.2d at 794.
Id. at 368, 497 S.E.2d at 795.
See Washington v. South Ga. Med. Ctr., 226 Ga. App. 554, 487 S.E.2d 125 (1997).
See Washington v. South Ga. Med. Ctr., 221 Ga. App. 640, 472 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
Id.
269 Ga. at 368, 497 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting Washington v. South Ga. Med. Ctr.,
App. 554, 558, 487 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1997)).
Id. at 366, 497 S.E.2d at 794.
221 Ga. App. at 641-42, 472 S.E.2d at 329-30.
See Washington, 226 Ga. App. at 555-56, 487 S.E.2d at 126-27.
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the court of appeals, Judge Andrews justified ignoring the prior singlepanel decision by characterizing it as mere dicta.163
The supreme court disagreed across the board, holding that the singlepanel decision affirming the trial court on this issue was not dicta
because it was a necessary part of the ultimate determination of the
appeal; otherwise reversal, not remand, would have been
required."M
165
case.
the
of
Accordingly, the decision constituted the law
Ironically, during the survey period, the court of appeals reaffirmed
the long-standing principle that one party cannot claim the benefit of
sanctions assessed against the opposing party based on failure to
respond to written discovery propounded by a co-party.'6 6 Given "the
economics of the practice of law," one can hardly understand the
distinction drawn between deposition notices and written discovery.
After all, co-parties rely on all written discovery responses in a case, not
just those they propounded. When attending a deposition noticed by
another party, co-parties often prepare utilizing documents obtained as
a result of other parties' written discovery.
K.

PretrialOrder

In Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Phillips,6 ' plaintiffs
stipulated in the pretrial order that damages would be capped at $1
million per plaintiff, or $2 million total.'68 After the jury returned a
verdict for both plaintiffs in the amount of $3.5 million, plaintiffs'
counsel decided to rethink his stipulation, and the trial court entered
judgment for the full amount of the verdict.6 9
The supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that the pretrial
order controls unless amended or modified, which was not done in this
case at or before trial. 70 It is now crystal clear that Georgia trial
courts have no discretion
to amend or modify a pretrial order after the
171
trial has concluded.

163.
164.
165.
166.
(1997).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 555, 487 S.E.2d at 126.
269 Ga. at 368, 497 S.E.2d at 795.
Id.
West v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., 230 Ga. App. 41, 42, 495 S.E.2d 300, 302
268 Ga. 316, 486 S.E.2d 851 (1997).
Id. at 316, 486 S.E.2d at 853-54.
Id., 486 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 318-19, 486 S.E.2d 855.
Id. at 319, 486 S.E.2d at 855.
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L. Bifurcation or Trifurcationin Punitive Damages Cases
Since Georgia's punitive damages statute passed the General
Assembly in 1987, a debate has raged in the bar and bench.172 The
question: should tort trials involving punitive damages and similar act
evidence be bifurcated (separated into two phases) 73 or trifurcated
(three phases)? 74 That such trial must at least be bifurcated is
mandated by the punitive damages statute, which requires separation
of the determination of liability for punitive damages from determination
of the amount of punitive damages.'7 5
The perceived need to separate issues springs from the desire to avoid
prejudicing defendants in the determination of liability and the amount
of compensatory damages without prejudicing plaintiffs in the determination of liability and the amount of punitive damages. 7 ' The belief
is that, in a DUI civil trial for instance, evidence of prior DUIs is
irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the determination of liability for
causing the collision.'7 7 Evidence of prior DUIs, however, is highly
probative of the need for punitive damages." 8
The groundwork for the debate was actually laid two years before
Georgia's punitive damages statute was enacted, when the supreme
court decided Moore v. Thompson.'7 9 In Moore, the supreme court held
that "the trial judge should exercise his discretion under O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-42(b) to try the issue of punitive damages separately in a
bifurcated procedure or in a separate trial."18° Then, when the punitive damages statute passed, a different bifurcation procedure was
required, separating the trial of liability and the amount of punitive
damages.""

172. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1998).
173. See City of Monroe v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 332, 334, 411 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1991)
(similar act evidence properly considered in first phase on issue of liability for punitive
damages).
174. See Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 159, 444 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1994)
(severance of professional negligence trial into three phases: liability for and amount of
compensatory damages in phase one; liability for punitive damages in phase two; and
amount of punitive damages in phase three).
175. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1998).
176. See Webster v. Boyett, 269 Ga. 191, 193-94, 496 S.E.2d 459, 461-62 (1998).
177. Id. at 193, 496 S.E.2d at 461.
178. See Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 237-38, 336 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1985).
179. 255 Ga. 236, 336 S.E.2d 749 (1985).
180. Id. at 238, 336 S.E.2d at 751.
181. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1998).
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Thus, in order to satisfy the legislature and the supreme court's
"suggestion" in Moore, trial courts at times resorted to a trifurcated
procedure, with liability and the amount of compensatory damages first,
liability for punitive damages second, and the amount of punitive
damages third.
In Webster v. Boyett,'82 the supreme court revisited the issue for the
first time since Moore and the subsequent enactment of the punitive
damages statute. 183 The court held that trifurcation was not required,
and the proper procedure to be employed should be left to the discretion
of the trial court on a case-by-case basis. 84 Citing a host of reasons
not to trifurcate, the court held "[i]t is the rare case where, due to the
complexity of the issues or evidence, the trial court should divide the
trial into three separate phases."8 5
Under the court's reasoning, trifurcation would never be warranted in
cases in which the similar act evidence is relevant to the determination
of liability for compensatory damages."8 8 For instance, in a product
liability action, prior similar incidents often demonstrate notice and/or
proof of the defect.'87 When allowed for such purposes, no need exists
to conduct more than the mandatory two phases required by the punitive
damages statute. 88
M. Notice to Produce Evidence
Two survey cases, Gaffron v. MARTA' s9 and Peacock v. HCP III
Eastman, Inc.,' 9° clarified that a notice to produce evidence at trial
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-10-26 is enforceable notwithstanding the
expiration of the discovery period.' 9 ' Nonetheless, the court of appeals
will seem to apply the same discovery-type analysis to the determination
of whether to compel compliance.' 92

182. 269 Ga. 191, 496 S.E.2d 459 (1998).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 195, 496 S.E.2d at 463.
185. Id. at 196, 496 S.E.2d at 463-64.
186. Id. at 196-97, 496 S.E.2d at 463-64.
187. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 543-44, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639-40
(1993).
188. Id.
189. 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997).
190. 230 Ga. App. 726, 497 S.E.2d 253 (1998).
191. See Gaffron, 229 Ga. App. at 433, 494 S.E.2d at 60. See also 230 Ga. App. at 726,
497 S.E.2d at 253.
192. 230 Ga. App. at 727-28, 497 S.E.2d at 254-55.
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LEGISLATION

Legislation passed during the survey period which requires notification of nonparties when their medical records are requested in connection with a civil action. 9 ' The General Assembly enacted a summary
procedure for disposal of frivolous litigation against members of the
judiciary relating to their official duties which allows recovery of
attorney fees.1'9 Additionally, legislation passed which allows judges
to award attorney fees even in dismissed actions involving the exercise
of the right of free speech and the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.' 95
New legislation allows service of process on an uninsured motorist
carrier outside the normal statute of limitations in the event facts give
rise to the belief that the tortfeasor is uninsured or underinsured after
the action has been commenced. 96 At such point, the plaintiff is given
ninety days to perfect service on the insurer. 97
In wrongful death cases, legislation was passed making the distribution of proceeds recovered in wrongful
death actions consistent with the
98
laws of intestate succession.

There was also quite a bit of additional proposed legislation which
would have impacted upon the area of trial practice and procedure that
did not pass one or both houses during the most recent session of the
Georgia General Assembly.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This survey is not intended to be exhaustive and addresses only the
more notable decisions and enactments. The authors hope this analysis
provides some insight into these recent developments in the law.
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195.
196.
197.
198.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34 (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 9-15-15.
Id. § 9-11-11.1(f).
Id. § 33-7-11(d).
Id.
Id. § 51-4-2.

